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Ulrike Kistner 
University of the Witwatersrand 
"Illness as Metaphor" is the name of a trope that has become 
commonplace ever since the publication of Susan Sontag's book 
with the same title. The book is dedicated to a twofold but para- 
doxical objective: the elucidation of and the liberation from meta- 
phors of illness (4). On the one hand, Sontag's analysis distances 
itself from metaphoricization. It expressly disallows the notion of 
illness as metaphor: ". . . the most truthful way of regarding ill- 
ness-and the healthiest way of being ill-is one most purified of, 
most resistant to, metaphoric thinking" (3). 
On the other hand, the book devotes itself in large part to the 
description of metaphors of illness. Modern metaphors of illness, 
especially those based on descriptions of tuberculosis and cancer, 
Sontag believes, suggest "a profound disequilibrium between indi- 
vidual and society, with society conceived as the individual's ad- 
versary" (73). Metaphors of illness are given such extensive scope 
and weight in Sontag's work on the subject that any notion of an 
"appropriate" diagnosis and treatment is moved out of sight, her 
conclusion notwithstanding. Consequently, Sontag's vision of a 
demystification of illness remains distant, if not vacuous. 
In the following, I attempt to resolve the paradoxes arising from 
this apparent contradiction. In order to assess the ambiguous sup- 
positions involved-the ubiquitousness of metaphoric constructions 
of illness on the one hand, and the liberation from metaphors on the 
other hand-the structures of metaphor would have to be identified 
and differentiated. These in turn would have to be analyzed within 
the framework of an archaeology of knowledge. Thirdly, and this 
is probably the most intriguing question, one would have to inves- 1
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tigate how certain metaphoric constructions can arise from super- 
seded knowledge formations and resurface in peculiarly modern 
functions. Finally, we would have to address the question thrown 
up by Sontag's account of illness-as-metaphor: namely how the role 
of metaphor can be conceptualized, both in its mythical functions 
and in its occurrence in scientific statements. 
Only a historically and structurally differentiated account of 
metaphor would, I would argue, allow us to explain how metaphori- 
cal language can function both in a "pre-scientific" and in a scien- 
tific context, as well as in the context of pre-critical or uncritical 
modern mythologies-namely in those instances where sciences or 
cosmologies have not been able to formulate precise causal con- 
nections. It is particularly in these contexts that metaphor offers 
unique linguistic possibilities for causal explanations, whose dif- 
ferent structures would have to be determined more specifically. 
The different possibilities offered by metaphoric constructions 
have been the subject of philosophical debate since the 1960s, es- 
pecially in Anglo-American philosophy. Analytical philosophy 
usurped the task of semiotics and rhetoric in developing the theory 
and medieval systems of logic, 
while providing analyses of types of analogy, have not attempted a 
justification of the validity of analogical arguments (Hesse 63). More 
specifically, the type of semiotics that informs Susan Sontag's trea- 
tise on Illness as Metaphor cannot fully account for the complex 
requirements and functions of metaphor. This, however, is not a 
new insight. As early as 1756, the German philosopher Ernst Anton 
Nicolai (1722-1802) lashed out polemically at a comparable type 
of medical semiotics, which had solidified into an institutionalized 
academic discipline. Nicolai acknowledges that medical semiotics 
devoted itself to the study of the "facts and processes of the human 
body" but criticizes the semoticians' incapability of explaining or 
causally analyzing those facts and processes. A causal explanation, 
according to Nicolai, would fall into the domain of philosophical 
knowledge. In his critique, which seems equally relevant today and 
which could be made to pertain to Susan Sontag's description of 
Illness as Metaphor, Nicolai calls for philosophical inquiry as a 
condition for the discovery of causality essential for medical diag- 
nosis: 
Philosophical inquiry enables one to apply historical insights 
in select cases, and indicates the conditions under which this 2




or that comes into effect. Any particular process, changes in 
the human body, for instance, any accidental occurrence, can 
indicate something good or bad, depending on circumstances. 
But this is an insight that is lost on the semioticians; they do 
not bother to consider or understand this type of knowledge. 
They take recourse to mere words and attribute something bad 
or dangerous or good to this or that thing or process. But this 
remains nondescript and cannot yield useful information for 
any given case. . . . Is it not more advisable to refrain from 
saying anything than to say something like that? Oh ye 
semioticians, if only you would bother to learn the rules of logic! 
Why not summon logic to expel the hazy darkness which per- 
vades the entire realm of semiotics, so as to bypass the laby- 
rinths of error and to formulate your sentences with the requi- 
site degree of precision! And do not hide behind the words in 
which you seek refuge, and do not apply screws to your words. 
(qtd. in Eckart 4; my translation and emphasis) 
This remarkably early critique of a one-dimensional concept of the 
linguistic sign already indicates a dualistic definition and function 
of the sign which is to become pathbreaking for both linguistics 
and medicine: that is, the lexical-semiotic and the syntactic-seman- 
tic determination of the sign. As early as 1756, Nicolai formulates 
a concept of the sign which is comparable to both that of the Stoa 
and that of modern linguistics: 
That through which we can recognize the existence or the real- 
ity of something is what we call sign, signum, and that whose 
existence or reality we recognize through the sign is what we 
call the signified, the signified thing, signatum . . . and the link 
between the signified thing with the sign is what we call mean- 
ing. (qtd. in Eckart 5; my translation) 
This is what defines the significatory model of eighteenth-century 
semiotic medicine: all signs, being of equal value, interact within a 
system. Within this model, no distinction is being drawn between 
sign and symptom: every manifestation of disease could, without 
essential modification, take on the value of a sign, provided that an 
informed medical reading could place it within the chronological 
totality of the illness. Every symptom is a potential sign, and the 
sign is simply a read symptom (Foucault 159). 3
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Nicolai challenges this view of illness. The illness itself, he 
maintains, is not a signifying entity; it remains hidden to the senses. 
Contemporaries of Nicolai discovered the play of accidental ran- 
domness beneath the classification of characteristic signs of illness. 
Due to the role of accidental randomness, not every phenomenon 
of illness has a known semiotic meaning; not every co-incidence 
can be accessed as a sign (qtd. in Hess 60). The symptom can re- 
main silent, its signifying function can be effaced, the sign is no 
longer the speaking symptom. Foucault quotes Condillac in stating 
that " 'every symptom is a sign' by right, 'but not every sign is a 
symptom' in the sense that the totality of symptoms will never be 
able to exhaust the reality of the sign" (93). 
The evidence and certainty of symptoms as indicators of ill- 
ness becomes shaky. Diagnosis is determined probabilistically 
through the observation of a random configuration of signs in a 
converging series: coughing, chronic fever, expectoration, and he- 
moptysis make phthisis more and more probable. It becomes a mat- 
ter of reading a particular pathological state in the course of its 
evolution, and of foreseeing its most probable development (Fou- 
cault 160-61). The nature of co-incidence is being determined more 
precisely, and is being brought into a causal relation with the ill- 
ness in question (qtd. in Hess 55). The attempt of a causal determi- 
nation of co-incidence becomes the foundation of a theoretically 
elaborated symptomatology; from a phenomenon of illness, its hid- 
den cause is being inferred (qtd. in Hess 56). These developments 
deepen the legitimation crisis of a semiotic medicine. While semiotic 
medicine abstracts characteristic symptoms from a multiplicity of 
individual signs, diagnostic medicine relates the symptom as effect 
to a cause (Eckart 4). Hence it is no longer signs that form the basis 
of diagnosis and assessment of illness; the coterie of diagnoses shift 
to the role of temporally organized converging series (Hess 87). 
The notion of co-incidence introduces a temporal, historical, and 
causal dimension into the previously one-dimensional sign system. 
The new organizing principles are highlighted in Zimmermann's 
treatise Ober die Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst of 1764. The illness 
in question, according to Zimmermann, is a construct which estab- 
lishes temporal relations between various symptoms. The diagno- 
sis can be stated only through knowledge of the historicity of co- 
incidences, not on the basis of the determination of essential char- 
acteristics of the illness (qtd. in Hess 85). 4




The theoretical approaches heralding this shift can be seen to 
anticipate or respond to the "crisis of medicine," which is aptly 
summarized by one of Kant's students, Johann Benjamin Erhard, 
in his publication entitled Ueber die Medicin (1795): 
Medicine is commonly viewed as the art of genius, which does 
not understand its own subject-matter ... which does not know 
how to conceptualize its proper object, and which remains un- 
certain about the effects of its own instruments. Medicine wants 
to assume the same place among the arts as among the sci- 
ences, namely that of a discipline which can defend its rightful 
place neither in terms of reason nor in terms of observation. 
(qtd. in Hess 128; my translation) 
This criticism pertains not only to medicine, though; it points to the 
dilemma of the foundation of the life sciences qua sciences, which 
can no longer appeal to physical and mechanical laws in explaining 
the phenomena of life. This discontinuity comes to the fore in Kant's 
philosophy of nature. Kant introduces the concept of the purpo- 
siveness of nature to provide a new type of explanation of cause- 
and-effect relations pertaining to phenomena of nature as a founda- 
tion for the emerging sciences of life. 
The philosophical foundation of the sciences of life, with its 
method of showing causally conditioned functional relations, opened 
the way for new diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic possibili- 
ties and clinical methods in medicine. Physiologists of the nine- 
teenth century turned against their natural historian predecessors 
with accusations of ontologizing illness and disease (i.e., of elevat- 
ing disease to the status of an organism within an organism and, 
correspondingly, of viewing disease as proceeding according to its 
own laws), of confusing the cause or the contagium with the dis- 
ease itself, and of engaging in unscientific classification of "spe- 
cies" of disease more botanico (Hess 258). 
Thus the 1830s and 1840s mark a turning point in academic 
medicine. The term 'semiotics' is being eradicated from medical 
textbooks, and the concept of 'diagnostics' makes its entry (Eckart 
11). In those isolated cases where a semiotic notion of the sign 
survives, it appears in the context of a static description or naming 
of states of illness or individual constitution, devoid of any refer- 
ence to or proof of causal connections. Henceforth semiotics finds 
its place in eclectic practices which reject theorization. Incapable 5
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of diagnosis, medical semiotics finds itself reduced to phenomenol- 
ogy (Hess 252). 
This supersession of semiotic by diagnostic medicine does not, 
however, spell the end of the significance and modelling function 
of linguistics for medicine. In a move parallel to the paradigm shift 
in medical diagnosis, a purely semiotic concept of the sign becomes 
untenable in linguistics. The introduction of the temporal factor, 
which facilitates the conceptualization of causal relations, becomes 
the acid test not only for medicine, but likewise for linguistics and 
narratology. The mutual imbrication of temporal sequence and logi- 
cal consequence, which the scholastics captured in the formula post 
hoc, ergo propter hoc (whereby what is temporally post- appears 
as the effect of a logically preceding cause), finds its systematic 
application here (Barthes 248). However, this mutual imbrication 
can be accounted for only at the cost of a dualism which makes its 
effects felt both in the history of medicine and in the history of 
linguistics: namely the dualism between synchrony and diachrony, 
which becomes definitive of both modern linguistics and diagnos- 
tic medicine. For the case of anatomo-clinical medicine, Foucault 
remarks: 
The clinician's gaze was directed upon a succession and upon 
an area of pathological events; it had to be both synchronic and 
diachronic, but in any case it was placed under temporal obedi- 
ence; it analysed a series. (162-63) 
On the introduction of the temporal dimension into linguistics, 
Ferdinand de Saussure notes: ". . . if we considered the community 
of speakers without considering time, we would not see the effect 
of the social forces that influence language" (78). 
The introduction of the temporal dimension, according to de 
Saussure, has the following effect: 
Language is no longer free, for time will allow the social forces 
at work on it to carry out their effects. This brings us back to 
the principle of continuity, which cancels freedom. But conti- 
nuity necessarily implies change, varying degrees of shifts be- 
tween the signified and the signifier. (78) 
The mastery of time as duration in medicine similarly changes the 
configuration of relations involved in signification. The sign in 6




medicine is no longer viewed exclusively as a semiotic sign with 
an unmotivated relationship between signifier and signified, but in 
terms of a syntactic combinatory. The sentence forms an order which 
is not reducible to individual words or the sum of individual words 
(see Barthes 239). The sense of a word cannot be considered in 
isolation from its integral position within a specific syntagm, and 
from its capacity to fulfill a specific syntactic function. The mas- 
tery of time becomes possible only through syntax, not only through 
verb tenses, temporal adjectives, adverbs, prepositions and conjunc- 
tions, and temporal, causal, and final clauses, but also through the 
logical-chronological (con)sequence of statements, which consti- 
tute predication. This would explain why, in Foucault's account of 
the emergence of the clinical method, the essence of the signified- 
the heart of the disease-would be entirely exhausted in the intelli- 
gible "syntax of the signifier" (91; my emphasis). 
The division between synchrony and diachrony characteristic 
of the modern critical human sciences and of the modern sciences 
of life effects a breakup of the monistic concept of the sign. In 
relation to metaphor, this would entail that an exclusive focus on 
the word does not offer an appropriate framework for the analysis 
of metaphor, for the operation of metaphor is not confined to the 
model of the word. To generate a metaphor, we minimally need a 
sentence-framing predication. This interaction of metaphor mod- 
eled on the plane of the word and metaphor modeled on the plane 
of predication can be thought of as two vectors which cross each 
other's paths in the word as site of the metaphoric effect combining 
the semiotics of lexical elements and the semantics of the sentence. 
Metaphor is situated at the interface between the plane of words 
and the plane of sentences. It arises from an interchange between 
denomination and predication (Ricoeur 172). This interaction pro- 
duces a tension between semantic pertinence and semantic imperti- 
nence. A living metaphor, in bringing together two different, hith- 
erto distant fields, violates semantic pertinence in its predication, 
which pertains to two different fields. But it is precisely its seman- 
tic impertinence that allows it to arrive at a new description; it dis- 
solves one order in order to find another one (Ricoeur 22). 
These properties of metaphor have led Max Black, Mary Hesse, 
Richard Boyd, and other theoreticians dealing with the logic and 
structure of scientific discovery and revolution to equate the role 
of metaphor in poetic language with that of the model in science: 
the scientific model is treated as a more general kind of metaphor 7
Kistner: Illness as Metaphor? The Role of Linguistic Categories in the His
Published by New Prairie Press
18 STCL, Volume 22, No. I (Winter, 1998) 
(Black 236). Like metaphor, the scientific model serves minimally 
as a heuristic instrument, but more likely as one that explodes tra- 
ditional interpretations and paves the way for new, more adequate 
interpretations. The model in science is considered an instrument 
of finding a new description or theory, and this is what locates it 
properly in the domain of the logic of scientific discovery. Viewed 
in this role, it is again the semantic operations of metaphor that are 
being emphasized: 
the employment of metaphor serves as a nondefinitional mode 
of reference fixing which is especially well suited to the intro- 
duction of terms referring to . . . complex relational properties, 
rather than to features of internal constitution. (Boyd 358; my 
emphasis) 
Metaphors fulfilling this function, termed "theory-constitutive meta- 
phors" by Boyd, are non-semiotic and therefore do not allow for 
exegesis. Any attempt to decode them is misplaced. Instead, they 
lead readers to discover a terminology for theory-constitution (360- 
61). 
Considering the paradigm shift dividing semiotic from diag- 
nostic medicine, and the paradigm shift breaking up a monistic 
semiotic concept of the sign, Susan Sontag's description of illness 
in terms of a semiotic understanding of metaphor seems puzzling. 
The most common description of metaphors of illness as expres- 
sion of a disturbed social order is based on a homologous correla- 
tion between signifier and signified, and in an extended sense be- 
tween denotation and connotation. The description of the function 
and modus operandi of modern myths merges with the description 
of the object of myth-making. This procedure presupposes what it 
sets out to explain, thereby creating a circulus vitiosus, based on 
the notion of metaphor as the transposition of meaning confined to 
the word. Where the word is chosen as basic unit of a tropology, 
the transposition characteristic of metaphor is limited to substitu- 
tion. Metaphor utilized for purposes of substitution produces zero 
information value. Where the tension between the literal and the 
metaphorical is missing at the outset, substitutive metaphors con- 
tribute to mythologization, rather than critically unpacking it. In 
the process, substitutive metaphors reveal themselves as dead meta- 
phors, which cancel themselves out as metaphors, as they are taken 
up by everyday language. 8




Considered under these aspects, common descriptions of meta- 
phors of illness, as they find mention in Susan Sontag's work and 
in cultural histories of illness and disease generally, do not escape 
the suspicion of mythologization. Not venturing a philosophically 
founded critique, they immerse themselves in the logic of their ob- 
ject. They are satisfied with stating pseudo-etiologies, which at- 
tempt to refer (constructs of) illness to general individual or soci- 
etal conditions without attempting to explain illness by specific 
causation or within particular paradigms. In this way, the descrip- 
tions of illness-as-metaphor establish precisely the generalized con- 
nections which the recourse to metaphor invokes, and which they 
are supposed to specify and explain but end up reproducing instead. 
These descriptions cannot formulate a critique, never mind develop 
or describe new theory-constitutive metaphors. 
On closer inspection, pre-critical and theory-constitutive meta- 
phors have one thing in common, though. As Max Black states, 
"we need metaphors in just those cases where there can be no ques- 
tion as yet of the precision of scientific statements" (37). Paul 
Feyerabend, likewise, makes a case for the legitimacy of taking 
recourse to "religion, mythology, . . . the ideas of incompetents or 
the ramblings of madmen" (47, 68) for purposes of either 
counterinduction or falsification indispensable for establishing the 
validity of a theory, or for purposes of clarifying meaning-terms or 
observation-predicates in statements that are only incompletely 
understood. However, learning to argue with unexplained terms and 
to use sentences for which no clear rules of usage are as yet avail- 
able calls forth the problem of incommensurability in turn. The in- 
commensurability problem is compounded if an attempt is made to 
explain the unexplained meaning-terms or observation-predicates 
by invoking myth and metaphor, as the latter stand in a relation of 
incommensurability to scientific statements; although there might 
be similarities in structure or content-classes, the universal prin- 
ciples of the one framework are suspended by the other (Feyerabend 
271). This leads the Campbellian (in Mary Hesse's construed dia- 
logue about "The Function of Models") to stipulate that if the ob- 
servation-predicates in the theory are uninterpreted, the interpreta- 
tion given by the model (or metaphor) must conform to the terms 
of the theory: the whole theory must have a model interpretation, 
which also provides an interpretation of the theoretical predicates 
through the correlation of (interpreted) observation-predicates with 
the theoretical predicates. (Otherwise one could not explain how 9
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the observation-predicates get into the theory, to enable it to make 
predictions [Hesse 45].) 
The circularity which results from the tenet that models/meta- 
phors have an explanatory or heuristic or filling-the-gap role in cases 
of incommensurability between or within theoretical statements and 
are yet subject to an incommensurability in relation to scientific 
theory, is evident in both Feyerabend's and Hesse's accounts of the 
role of models and metaphors in science. The resulting dilemma 
can be characterized in other words as follows: if incompletely un- 
derstood meaning-terms are clarified by recourse to existing no- 
tions from a different domain, treating the new as a special case of 
things already understood (as is the case with substitutive meta- 
phors), then the possibility of conceptual discovery is considerably 
reduced (Feyerabend 256). This dilemma, arising from the circu- 
larity in the interarticulation of incommensurability and the role of 
models/metaphors, leads both the Duhemist and the Campbellian 
in Mary Hesse's construed dialogue to address the type of analogy/ 
model/metaphor in terms of which one can draw one-to-one corre- 
spondences between models and observation-predicates before one 
has elaborated the theory, by positing some kind of prescientific 
recognition of analogies (Hesse 47-48). 
This dilemma provides good reason to unravel Susan Sontag's 
reflections on illness-as-metaphor once more instead of relegating 
them to the sphere of ideological mythmaking (albeit at a meta- 
level). It turns out that the metaphors of illness described by Sontag 
arise largely as a result of precarious causal relations due to the 
fact that the etiology of the diseases concerned was not understood. 
This is acknowledged by Sontag for the case of tuberculosis in the 
last century, and for cancer and HIV today (5, 86-88). Sontag dis- 
tinguishes between traditional and modern metaphors of illness, 
which correspond to a distinction between more and less dead meta- 
phors: 
Illnesses have always been used as metaphors to enliven charges 
that a society was corrupt or unjust. Traditional disease meta- 
phors are principally a way of being vehement; they are, com- 
pared with the modern metaphors, relatively contentless. . . . 
Disease imagery is used to express concern for social order, 
and health is something everyone is presumed to know about. 
Such metaphors do not project the modern idea of a specific 
master illness, in which what is at issue is health itself. (72) 10




Traditional metaphors of illness, according to Sontag, generally arise 
in cases where there was no possibility as yet of specific diagnosis 
and treatment. Research into the historical spread of epidemics could 
only be undertaken once medicine had attained clarity about the 
specific causes and effects and modes of transmission of individual 
epidemics. This in turn presupposed that notions of epidemics and 
contagia were separated from their natural history context; recourse 
to the orders of botany and zoology had to be given up in favor of 
the recognition of the significance of temporal, historical, and causal 
relations (Bleker 196, 200, 203). 
By way of adducing examples of modern metaphors of illness, 
Sontag mentions cancer, tuberculosis, and HIV. What all of these 
have in common is the fact that their etiologies have either not been 
fully established in modern biomedicine or have remained contested 
over a long period of time. These disease constructs show in an 
exemplary way that a theory linking causes and effects has remained 
the weakest spot of pathology over the last 150 years. This is evi- 
dent especially in the case of tuberculosis. Koch's postulates of 
specific causation of infectious diseases require a combination of 
necessary and sufficient causes for the diseases concerned. Weakly 
sufficient causes dominated the explanations until the middle of 
the nineteenth century: diseases were vaguely related to miasmata, 
humors, vapors, etc. Koch and Pasteur, however, did not content 
themselves with these explanations. To provide a scientific basis 
for therapeutic interventions, criteria of necessary causation were 
required: the occurrence of a disease was to be led back to the pres- 
ence of a specific causative agent, and the absence of the causative 
agent was to correspond to the absence of disease (Robert Koch's 
second paper on "The Etiology of Anthrax," 1881). Through estab- 
lishing criteria of necessary causation, Koch attempted to formu- 
late a stronger notion of sufficient causation, which at the same 
time prefigured the methods of diagnosis. After several theoretical 
and experimental attempts, Koch presented the requirements of 
sufficient causation: the micro-organism had to be isolated from 
the diseased body, cultivated in the laboratory, and another organ- 
ism inoculated with it, which then had to present the same symp- 
toms (Robert Koch on "The Etiology of Tuberculosis," 1884). It is 
this criterion that turned into the Achilles heel of all theories of 
specific disease causation. For it turned out that an organism may 
have tubercle bacilli without necessarily developing the symptoms 
of tuberculosis; and that which Koch termed tuberculosis included 11
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other diseases which, as far as Koch could make out, arose from 
the same causative agent. In the case of other infectious diseases, 
Koch could not find micro-organisms as causative agents (Robert 
Koch on "New Investigations on the Role of Micro-Organisms in 
Infectious Diseases," 1877). Similar results were found in relation 
to the cholera bacterium (as in Pettenkofer's famous self-experi- 
ment), as well as in relation to diphtheria. Early bacteriologists came 
to rely for diagnosis largely on the criterion of necessary causation. 
In the face of the problems surrounding diagnostic causality in 
bacteriology, Koch and other bacteriologists were inclined to have 
recourse to metaphors. In the name of specific disease causation, 
bacteria were imbued with an essential identity. Thus, Koch cel- 
ebrates his discovery of the tubercle bacillus in 1882 in the follow- 
ing terms: 
in the battle against this terrible plague affecting humankind, 
we will in future no longer be dealing with an indefinite some- 
thing, but with a tangible parasite . . . (I 1: 444; my transla- 
tion) 
In 1890, Koch proclaimed that a cure for tuberculosis was in sight. 
In his lecture on this occasion, Koch spoke of bacteria in terms of 
"the smallest but most dangerous enemies of the human race," which 
had to be combated (I: 660; my translation). Koch's speeches abound 
with a combination of military and organicist metaphors: 
Even during times of peace the military diseases are stalking 
the army and gnawing at its marrow. But when the torch of war 
is ablaze, they come crawling out of their hideouts, raise their 
heads to gigantic heights, and destroy everything in their way. 
(II 1: 298; my translation) 
Specific diseases were being identified with the bacteria linked to 
them; and bacteria, in turn, were personified as "the enemy." The 
dialogue between medical theory and the respective contemporary 
political jargon is one of the factors accounting for the rapid suc- 
cess and growing popularity of the new science of bacteriology 
(Gradmann 44). Gradmann summarizes his observations on the 
notions of illness promulgated in the process of the popularization 
of bacteriology as follows: 
1. No distinction is made between disease and its causative 
agent. 12




2. There is no notion of an independent process of the dis- 
ease . ... Instead, infection and therapy are foregrounded, 
mostly in the terms of . . . an attack (of bacteria), followed 
by a counter-attack (by medical practitioners). Causative 
agents of disease are personified and elevated to subjects 
endowed with agency. "Disease" appears as a confronta- 
tion between bacteria and doctors. 
3. The patient is effaced along with the process of disease, or 
(s)he is identified with the disease itself. In the absence of 
the patient, the disease is viewed as a duel between doc- 
tors and bacteria. (Gradmann 43) 
The metaphoricization identified here largely involves dead meta- 
phors or substitutive metaphors which can fulfill only a limited heu- 
ristic function, if any. What is evident in this type of 
metaphoricization is the convergence of the attempted establish- 
ment of causal relations needed for the foundation of bacteriology 
as science, and its justification and popularization. The substitutive 
metaphors employed here have a persuasive rather than a predic- 
tive function. This becomes clear if we take a closer look at the 
dyadic relations-the pairs of corresponding terms-within analo- 
gies, which the metaphors gamble on. On a horizontal level we find 
correspondences in terms of similarity, identity, and difference. On 
a vertical axis, we find causal relations. The substitutive metaphors 
abounding in the history of early bacteriology largely establish 
analogies between four terms already known, e.g.: 
bacteria invasion/war 
sick person nation 
The vertical relations in this case are not specifically causal. There 
also does not seem to be any horizontal relation of similarity be- 
tween the terms, except by virtue of the fact that the two pairs are 
related by the same vertical relation. Thus, there is no horizontal 
relation independent of the vertical relation. In contrast to predic- 
tive analogies, the analogies/metaphors mentioned here serve to 
bolster an argument which implicitly passes from asserting rela- 
tions which are already recognized to persuading the listener/viewer/ 
reader that other relations follow from these (Hesse 69-70). 
The metaphorically construed (pseudo-)causality was bolstered 
by recourse-condemned as retrogressive by the contemporary crit- 13
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ics of bacteriology-to a refunctionalized semiotics of medicine 
based on a monistic concept of the sign. By a reversion to an Aris- 
totelian tradition, disease causation (causa morbi) was conflated 
with the "essence" (ens morbi) of the disease. Bacteriological eti- 
ologies could only be formulated at the cost of returning to the 
ontologization of illness, as was common in pre-critical natural his- 
tory. 
The newly found possibilities and alleged dangers of bacteri- 
ology were the subject of heated debate at the time. For Rudolf 
Virchow, what was at stake was nothing less than "freedom of sci- 
ence in modern societies" (the title of his speech presented to the 
Congress of the Association of German Physicians and Scientists 
in Munich in 1879). Virchow contrasts the "freedom of scientific 
teaching" with a certain "speculative expansion," which "prema- 
turely formulates a series of theses which have as yet to be proved 
. . . but which are being adduced probabilistically in order to fill 
certain gaps in our knowledge." Virchow adds by way of a caution- 
ary note: 
We must not forget that there is a distinction to be drawn be- 
tween the speculative and the fully established fields of natural 
sciences. People ask of us scientists not only to designate this 
distinction with the greatest possible clarity but to fix it to such 
an extent that the individual scientist can ascertain with ever 
greater clarity where the distinction lies and to what extent he 
can be asked to acknowledge that what is taught is the truth. 
(Virchow 186; my translation) 
Virchow made it clear that he was highly sceptical about the 
refunctionalization of the doctrine of the contagium animatum by 
bacteriologists of the late nineteenth century. This contentious is- 
sue reached its climax in the debates between Virchow and Edwin 
Klebs. The contagium animatum-doctrine-i.e., the notion that in- 
fectious diseases are transmitted through living organisms and that 
these constitute the essence of the disease-can, according to 
Virchow, be traced back to the sixteenth century: 
Nonetheless people battled for a long time to find the living 
causes of illness. The sixteenth century did not find them, nor 
did the seventeenth and eighteenth. It was only in the nine- 
teenth century that people started actually finding out bit by bit 14




about contagia animata. But . . . the evidence has not been 
completely established by a long shot. . . . It turned out that a 
doctrine dating as far back as the sixteenth century, and occu- 
pying the imagination of men time and again ever since, gradu- 
ally found more and more positive proof for its correctness from 
the second decade of the (nineteenth) century onwards. One 
could on those grounds be tempted to conclude that one is 
obliged to think along the lines of the inductive expansion of 
our knowledge to the effect that all contagia and miasmata are 
living organisms. 
Virchow, however, opposes this conclusion by urging caution: 
We must not forget that the history of our sciences offers a 
great number of facts which teach us that appearances of strik- 
ing similarity can act in very different ways and achieve very 
different effects. (Virchow 194-95; my translation) 
What Virchow voices here is his suspicion that the monocausal 
explanations of bacteriology are untenable. Without wanting to 
question bacteriology's discovery of specific disease causation, the 
physiologists mooted their assumption that the infected organism 
itself might have a role to play in process of the disease. The prin- 
ciples of conditionalism arising from this assumption were formu- 
lated by Max Verworn (Causal and Conditional World View, 1912) 
and David von Hansemann. Quite independently, a concept of mul- 
tifactorial causation came to be accepted as a principle of immu- 
nology. At the same time, the notion of the specific effectivity of 
antibodies was retained. In his textbook on The Methods of 
Immunodiagnostics and Immunotherapy (1910), Julius Citron elabo- 
rates on these principles: 
We know now that the progress of an infectious disease de- 
pends not only on the type, the quantity, and the virulence of 
the disease germ, but also on the behaviour of the organism. 
The disease must be seen from the viewpoint of the reciprocal 
effect arising from these two groups of factors, although it is 
impossible to determine in detail the specific effect of the caus- 
ative agent and its products, and that of the reactive power of 
the organism. (qtd. in Fleck 55) 15
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This new version of the concept of causality shows a closer corre- 
spondence to the Kantian notion of "purposiveness of nature" (Kant 
313-93) than to the monocausal explanations of the early bacteriol- 
ogy at the end of the nineteenth century; for Kant's rejection of 
purely mechanistic models of causation applied to natural phenom- 
ena emanated precisely from the insight that the organic is not sub- 
ject to a linear, homologous cause-effect relationship. 
On the basis of these considerations, we could chart a path to- 
wards the transcendence of the dead metaphors and their semiotic 
descriptions. Ludwik Fleck, in his study on Genesis and Develop- 
ment of a Scientific Fact (1935), is concerned, among other things, 
with doing precisely that. The military metaphors of early bacteri- 
ology, which attempted to explain infectious diseases by invoking 
the notion of an "attack" by a bacterial "enemy" against the closed 
unit of the organism and the resulting battle against and triumph 
over the bacteria, are contrasted by an alternative metaphor which 
can better illustrate the multifactorial processes involved in dis- 
ease causation. Fleck explains why the metaphor of a military at- 
tack by external organisms is inappropriate: 
Most infectious diseases belong to [the class of pure changes 
within the constellation of reciprocally acting parts of the unit]. 
It is very doubtful whether an invasion in the old sense is pos- 
sible, involving as it does an interference by completely for- 
eign organisms in natural conditions. A completely foreign or- 
ganism could find no receptors capable of reaction and thus 
could not generate a biological process. It is therefore better to 
speak of a complicated revolution within the complex life unit 
than of an invasion of it. (61) 
Neither are war metaphors and the substantialization of the caus- 
ative agent as enemy, tenable in the context of chemical terms and 
their conceptual transformation. In this case, likewise, Fleck at- 
tempts to formulate a new terminology: 
Toxins, amboceptors, and complements were treated as chemi- 
cal entities, with such adversaries as anti-toxins and 
anticomplements. This primitive scheme based upon activat- 
ing and inhibitory substances is being progressively discarded 
in accordance with current physico-chemical and colloidal theo- 
ries in other fields. We now speak of states of structures rather 16




than substances, to express the possibility that a complex 
chemico-physico-morphological state is responsible for the 
changed mode of reaction, instead of chemically defined sub- 
stances or their mixtures being the cause. (63) 
The history of bacteriology offers numerous examples of reversions 
to substitutive metaphors as well as their revision. The initial search 
for syphilitic substances in the blood of supposed syphilitics con- 
tributed to the mistaken assumption of the specificity of the Wasser- 
mann reaction. The frequency of the (false) positive reactions was 
invoked in declaring syphilis a national pandemic-a "national 
enemy" which had to be combated. The chemotherapeutic discov- 
eries at the beginning of the twentieth century were similarly sub- 
stantialized and metaphoricized. Salvarsan was labeled either 
"magic bullet" or "devil's stuff." The former label was applied in 
the hope of killing the specific causative agents of syphilis with a 
single injection without impairing other bodily functions. The lat- 
ter label was invoked in the scandalizing of the new chemotherapy 
which became a media event, especially with reports about the al- 
legedly lethal side effects of Salvarsan. These particular metaphors 
belie the fact that the successes of Paul Ehrlich and his collabora- 
tors were based on the systematic utilization of the affinities of 
chemical dyes for the production of synthetic antigens. Ehrlich him- 
self, in taking up and simultaneously countering the then common 
metaphor of syphilis as "Amor's poisoned arrow," consequently 
coined an alternative metaphor (or, in this case, a simile incorpo- 
rated into an analogy), namely that of a poisoned arrow: 
The more complex structures of chemical therapies may be lik- 
ened to a poisoned arrow. The amboceptor is equivalent to the 
tip of the arrow, the antigen to the poison, and the complement 
to the arrow shaft. . . . Now certain primitive peoples paint 
their arrows . . . with several different poisons, in order to at- 
tain their end; there is the analogous possibility of applying 
two or three different poisons to the chemotherapeutic arrows. 
(qtd. in Cushing n.p.; my translation) 
Both Fleck's and Ehrlich's reformulations of common metaphors 
show a reorientation from a lexically based to a semantically based 
construction of metaphor, which not only places the word as sign 
in a lexical code but effects an extended predication. Analogies of 17
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the type adduced by Ehrlich infer certain properties as effects of a 
causal relation based on the prior and independent construction of 
horizontal relations of similarity. The resulting extended predica- 
tion, which can be predictive in a scientific context, thereby ap- 
proximates Ricoeur's criteria for a "living metaphor," which is 
conducive to a higher level of conceptualization (303). 
Susan Sontag's vision of a liberation from metaphoricization 
of illness, which does not as yet inflect her method of description 
of metaphor, would have to be redirected in the search for living 
metaphors which could facilitate new connections, instead of as- 
suming a substitutive relationship to some antecedently established 
monocausal correlation (Black 37). The search for living metaphors, 
or for their description and (historical) explanation, poses a chal- 
lenge to semiotic readings of illness-as-metaphor. The latter ap- 
proach can come dangerously close to reproducing dead metaphors. 
The history of bacteriology provides numerous examples of such 
an intertextuality of dead metaphors. A particularly striking example 
is featured in Gradmann's account of the popularization of bacteri- 
ology: "The popularization of a science which viewed bacteria as 
enemies was followed by an ideology which portrayed its enemies 
as bacteria in turn . . ." (51). This is all the more reason to approach 
the explanation of these metaphorical transpositions not only by 
way of a cultural-historical description but by way of a theoretical- 
critical intervention. 
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